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David Friedman is one of the leading figures in the law
and economics movement, that group of scholars who
use  economic  analysis  to  better  understand  legal 
systems  and  to  consider  reforms  that  may  lead  to 
more  efficient  outcomes.  Unlike  many  in  this  field,
Friedman’s  formal  training  is  neither  in  law  nor 
economics. Rather, he holds a Ph.D. in physics from the
University of Chicago.
Friedman’s first full-time academic appointment was
at Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University. At
VPI, he was colleagues with James Buchanan, Gordon
Tullock,  and  other  members  of  the  “public  choice”
school, who employ economics to analyze political deci-
sions  and  institutions.  By  that  time,  Friedman  had
published his first book, The Machinery of Freedom, in
which he made the case that a society without a state
could effectively handle such classic “public goods” as
police,  courts,  and  national  defense.  His  “anarcho-
capitalism” distinguished him from his father, Milton
Friedman, who, while an eloquent spokesperson for 
a market system, believed that some goods could not
be  produced  privately  and  argued  instead  for  a 
minimal state.
David  Friedman  currently  teaches  at  Santa  Clara
University.  In  addition  to  his  academic  work,  he  has
recently  written  two  novels,  Harald  and Salamander,
which  consider  many  important  economic,  legal,  and
philosophical  issues.  He  is  also  the  author  of  Hidden
Order: The Economics of Everyday Life, published in 1996,
one  of  the  first  of  several  relatively  recent  books  to
explain economic reasoning and policy in nontechnical
language  for  a  popular  audience.  Many  of  Friedman’s
papers  and  books  are  available  on  his  personal  Web 
site: www.daviddfriedman.com. Aaron Steelman inter-
viewed Friedman in April 2010. 
RF: Your formal academic training was in the physical
sciences. How did you become interested in economics?
And what was your path toward an academic career in
economics? 
Friedman:While I was working on my doctorate in physics
I was also writing columns on political and economic topics
as the token libertarian columnist for The New Guard, a con-
servative student magazine. While a post-doc in physics at
Columbia, I did a piece on population economics for the
Population  Council  as  well  as  writing  and  publishing 
The Machinery of Freedom. I concluded that I was a better
economist than physicist — had better intuition for the field.  
Julius Margolis, who ran the Fels Center for State and
Local Government at the University of Pennsylvania, saw
some of my work and offered me a post-doctoral position at
his center as an opportunity to switch fields. I accepted,
spent two years as a post-doc and one as a lecturer, and wrote
my piece on an economic theory of the size and shape of
nations,  which  was  eventually  published  in  the  Journal of
Political Economy.
At some point I met James Buchanan and found that we
had  similar  ideas  about  the  application  of  economics  to
understanding  political  institutions.  Buchanan  was  the 
dominant figure in the economics department at VPI. He
arranged for me to be hired there as an assistant professor. He
also, I think deliberately, arranged for me to be assigned to
teach quite a large part of the total syllabus over the course of
the next few years, thus filling in some of the gaps in my eco-
nomic education; teaching is a good way of learning.
RF: In your first book, The Machinery of Freedom, you
make the case for a polycentric legal system. How would
such a society overcome classic public goods problems,
such as courts and, perhaps an even more difficult issue,
national defense?  
Friedman: Courts don’t produce a public good, since they
can choose not to settle disputes between people who have
not paid them for the service. In the book, I describe how
rights protection and the resolution of disputes could be
produced as private goods.
National defense, on the other hand, is a public good, and
perhaps the most serious problem for the sort of society 
uI  described.  There  are,  however,  a  variety  of  ways  in 
which public goods are (imperfectly) privately produced —
consider radio broadcasts, or the public good of encouraging
taxi drivers to do a good job by tipping them, or the produc-
tion of open source software such as Linux, or the public
good of painting my house and so benefitting my neighbors.
Imperfect  production  means  that  a  public  good  may  be
worth  more  than  it  costs  but  still  not  get  produced.
Whether that will happen with the public good of national
defense depends on a variety of things, including how much
an  adequate  defense  costs.  I  was  more  pessimistic  about
doing it when the United States was facing a hostile power
with a thermonuclear arsenal than I am now. A discussion of
some of the imperfect ways in which it might be possible to
produce an adequate amount of this particular public good
would take more space than I’m inclined to give it here.
RF: In The Machinery of Freedom, you also make the case
for reforming the way students pay for their university
educations. Could you explain that proposal — and do
you think it could gain support in a world where tuition
and  associated  costs  seem  to  be  rising  considerably
more rapidly than inflation?
Friedman: I proposed something along the lines advocated
by Adam Smith — a university where professors were paid
directly by students. This would involve disaggregating the
variety of services that current universities perform. There 
is no strong reason why the same institution should be run-
ning hotels (called dormitories), restaurants (dining halls),
producing schooling, testing and certifying.
I think something along the lines I described may happen
online, where some of the difficulties of doing it in real space
disappear — no need to have everyone housed in the same
area, for instance. The main requirement is some form of
certification,  or  substitute  for  certification,  that  lets  a 
student learn a subject from whomever he wants and then
get his learning certified by a credible testing agency. I find
it  hard  to  believe  that  the  actual  education  part  of  what 
current colleges produce could cost as much as half of what
they now charge.
RF:  You  also  have  written  about  monetary  policy. 
In your opinion, what would be the most desirable way
to construct a monetary system? 
Friedman: What  I  proposed  was  a  system  of  competing
fractional reserve banks, each guaranteeing its currency with
a commodity bundle. If you bring me a million Friedman
dollars, I agree to give you in return a bundle of commodi-
ties: 500 pounds of grade X steel, 200 bushels of grade B
wheat, four ounces of gold, etc. Familiar mechanisms will
result in a price level, measured in my dollars, at which the
total value of the bundle is just a million.
The  most  important  argument  for  that  system  is  that
competing private money issuers have the right incentives.
Their  profit-maximizing  strategy  generates  stable  money,
since if their money is not stable, people will choose not to
use it, depriving them of the seignorage — probably in the
form of interest — that is their source of income. That is not
true for a government monopoly money. The advantage of a
commodity bundle over a single commodity is that it is less
subject to unpredictable fluctuations in value due to changes
in demand for or supply of individual commodities. Readers
interested  in  a  more  detailed  account  can  find  an  article 
I wrote for the Cato Institute titled “Gold, Paper, or…Is
There a Better Money” on Cato’s Web site. 
RF: The law and economics movement has made con-
siderable inroads in law schools and academia generally
over the past 30 years. What do you think are the big
remaining questions that law and economics scholars
ought to address?
Friedman: One of them is how to include legislators, judges,
and enforcers in the theory. In a consistent version of the
economic analysis of law, they have to be treated as rational
self-interested  actors,  just  like  criminals,  victims,  tortfea-
sors, and everyone else.
Another  problem  that  has  not  been  adequately  dealt
with, at least in anything I have seen, is the effect on optimal
enforcement theory of differences in offenders, most obvi-
ously  the  fact  that  different  offenders  face  different
probabilities of apprehension.
A final big question is the technology of judging — what
courts can do how well. If you assume a perfectly wise court
system, efficient law is easy — just severely punish anyone
who takes any inefficient action. If courts have no ability at
all to detect truth, on the other hand, they are of very little
use. Where between those points actual courts are, what
sorts of questions they can or cannot get reasonably correct
answers to, is a major element in figuring out what the law
should be.
RF: This is an intentionally broad question to which I
would  like  to  get  your  reaction:  How  close  does  the
American common law come to approximating an effi-
cient legal system? Where does it go right? Where does
it go wrong? 
Friedman: I  discuss  that  at  some  length  in  Law’s  Order, 
in the context of evidence for and against the Posner conjec-
ture.  My  favorite  example  of  inefficiency  is  that  in  the
common law of tort the value of life is zero, since if you tor-
tiously kill someone, his claim against you dies with him.
That cannot be the right answer.
In many other cases, one can make arguments for either
of  two  different  legal  rules,  sometimes  more  than  two. 
It’s tempting to observe what legal rule exists and then pro-
duce the argument to show that it’s efficient — but if there
were a different rule you could produce an argument for 
it instead. My own view is that there are elements of effi-
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RF: How would you suggest we think about the trade-
offs  associated  with  our  current  intellectual  property
regime? Does the system go too far in protecting the
rights of creators? If so, how far and what would be a
more desirable scheme?
Friedman:The immediate issue is not how far the rights of
creators should be protected but how far they can be. As
more  and  more  intellectual  property  takes  digital  form, 
easily  reproduced  and  distributed,  and  more  and  more 
people have access to fast Internet connections, it becomes
increasingly difficult to enforce laws giving creators control
over the intellectual property they create. At some point,
the sensible response is to abandon the attempt and shift to
other mechanisms for rewarding creators.
One of the subthemes of Future Imperfect, my most recent
nonfiction book, is that the proper response to technologi-
cal change is not to ask how we can keep doing what we are
doing that has become harder to do — enforce copyright
law, for instance. It is rather to ask how we can best achieve
our  objectives  under  the  new  circumstances.  Sometimes
that  means  abandoning  the  approach  that  has  become
unworkable, and shifting to a different approach that the
new technology makes more workable than before.
RF:  Many  people  seem  to  believe  that  less  crime  is
always more desirable, by definition. Could you briefly
explain your theory of the efficient level of crime and
what the policy implications of that theory might be?
Friedman: The optimal level of traffic accidents would be
zero if we could eliminate them without giving up anything
else we value. But the obvious way of eliminating all traffic
accidents is to stop driving, and few of us consider that a net
improvement.
If law enforcement were costless, we would still not want
to eliminate all illegal acts; consider the driver who is break-
ing the speed limit on his way to the hospital with his wife in
the  back  seat  going  into  labor,  or  Posner’s  example  of 
the  hunter  lost  and  starving  who  comes  across  a  locked 
cabin containing canned food and a telephone. Some such 
“efficient offenses” can be permitted by modifying the law to
make them legal — for instance under the doctrine of neces-
sity. In other cases the facts that make the offense efficient
cannot readily be demonstrated to an outside party such as a
court, so the best solution may be to set a penalty reflecting
the damage done by the offense and then let the potential
offender  decide  whether  it  is  a  price  worth  paying. The
result would be a level of offenses above zero.
In the real world, law enforcement is not costless. Once
one  allows  for  that,  it  may  be  desirable  to  set  levels  of
enforcement at which some inefficient offenses — offenses
that  harm  their  victims  by  more  than  they  benefit  the
offender — occur because preventing them costs more than
it is worth. Less obviously, it may be desirable to deter some
efficient crimes, because deterring them saves us the cost of
punishing them. For details see my Law’s Order.
RF: You have written a fair amount about the economics
of population growth. As you note in Law’s Order, there
seems to be a fairly widespread notion that “babies are a
bad thing.” How would you address that concern?
Friedman: Babies don’t arrive with a deed to a per-capita
share of the world’s resources clutched in their fists; if they
want land to build on or gasoline to drive with they will 
have to give those who own those resources something in
exchange worth at least as much. So to first approximation,
adding  another  person  to  the  world’s  population  makes
existing people better off, not worse off. It’s worth noting
that there is very little relation between how rich a country
is  in  resources  per  capita  and  how  rich  its  population  is; 
the  most  important  productive  resource  isn’t  land  or  oil 
but people.
Of course, people sometimes produce negative externali-
ties. But they also produce positive externalities. There is no
general reason to expect the negative effects to be larger
than the positive; when I tried to estimate both long ago (in
the  article  “Laissez-Faire  in  Population:  The  Least  Bad
Solution,”  which  is  available  on  my  personal Web  site)  I 
concluded that I could not tell whether the sum was positive
or negative.
RF: Much of the recent debate regarding medical care
legislation  seemed  to  be  predicated  on  the  idea  that
medical care should not be treated like other goods and
services. How would you respond?
Friedman: There  are  strongly  felt  emotional  attitudes
toward medical care that do not exist for many other goods
and services and that makes it more difficult to treat it as an
ordinary commodity. But I think it is hard to offer rational
reasons  in  support  of  those  attitudes,  or  good  economic
arguments against having it produced on the free market
like  food  or  housing.  For  details,  see  my  article  “Should
Medical  Care  Be  a  Commodity?”  available  on  my 
personal Web site.
RF: What do you think of “behavioral economics”? And
what does law and economics have to contribute to it?
Friedman: The observation that humans are not perfectly
rational is neither novel nor, I think, very useful. The point
at which it becomes interesting is when one can create a 
theory of how and why they are irrational, and hence just
how the choices they make will differ from the choices that
conventional economics predict that they will make. I have
an article that attempts to do that, based on evolutionary
psychology;  it’s  titled  “Economics  and  Evolutionary
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personal Web site. 
RF: Since you wrote Hidden Order,
several  other  popular  economics
books  have  been  published  by
commercial houses, some to great
fanfare  and  success.  To  what  do
you attribute the demand for and
popularity of such books?
Friedman: Part of it is that people
want  to  understand  economics, 
part is that economics is inherently
interesting.
RF: What issues are you working
on currently?
Friedman: My next nonfiction book
will probably be based on a seminar 
I  have  taught  for  some  years  under
the  title  of  “Legal  Systems  Very
Different from Ours.” It will describe
a considerable range of legal systems, including those of mod-
ern gypsies, imperial China, ancient Athens, the Cheyenne
Indians, Jewish law, and other arrangements, and attempt to
identify common threads that run through many or all legal
systems, and look at the different ways in which different
societies have dealt with their common legal problems.
RF: Please tell us about your recent novels. What do you
think  science  fiction  and  fantasy  can  teach  us  about 
economics and alternative legal systems? And why are
those  types  of  fiction  particularly  good  forums  for 
discussing such issues?
Friedman: I’ve published one novel — marketed as a fan-
tasy,  but  more  nearly  a  historical  novel  with  made-up 
history. A second, Salamander, is finished and webbed, but
has not yet found a publisher; that one is a real fantasy, com-
plete with my own, I think original, version of magic. I’m
currently working on a sequel to it.
The published novel, Harald(from Baen Books), is a story
not a treatise, but it contains a good deal of implicit eco-
nomics  and  political  philosophy.  One  implied  message  is
that political structures are about relations between persons,
not formal tables of organization; the mess my protagonist
has to deal with in the early part of the book grows out of the
acts of a young and inexperienced king who thinks people can
be trusted if and only if they are in allegiance to him, and so
tries to convert, by force, allies into subjects. 
The economics is mostly about the implications for the
project of raising and using armies of the fact that soldiers
don’t want to be killed. My protagonist is a military leader
from  a  semi-stateless  society,  faced  with  the  problem  of 
raising  and  supporting  an  army
without  taxes,  a  draft,  or  feudal
obligations.  One  consequence  is
that he is very sparing with the lives
of  his  troops,  since  if  fighting  for
him turns out to be too dangerous
he won’t have many volunteers next
time. Another is that he is reason-
ably  sparing  with  the  lives  of  his
enemies, since if he forces them to
surrender instead of killing them he
can  ransom  them  back  to  the
Empire, the antagonist he is fight-
ing, for the money he will need for
his  next  campaign.  A  lot  of  the 
military  strategy  ends  up  being
aimed  at  putting  the  opponent  in 
a  position  where,  if  he  doesn’t 
surrender, or at least withdraw, his
army will run out of food or water.
One of the two people the book is
dedicated to is the author of a fasci-
nating book on the logistics of the
army of Alexander the Great.
Salamander started  out  as  an  exploration,  in  a  fantasy 
context, of the central planning fallacy, the idea that if only
all of a society’s resources were under someone’s intelligent
control,  wonderful  things  could  be  done  with  them. The
equivalent, in a society where magic exists but is weak, is a
procedure that lets one wizard take control of the magical
power  of  many  others.  The  inventor  is  a  brilliant  but 
naive academic type who intends only good. Like his equiv-
alents in the real world, he misses both the fact that those
resources are already being used by their owners for their
own ends and the risk that the power will be used for other
than benevolent purposes. My other protagonist points out
the  first  problem  to  him  early  on,  and  his  colleague  and 
collaborator  forcibly  demonstrates  the  second  by  seizing
control of the process during the first full scale experiment
with it. As the book developed, it turned out to have at least
one other theme — in what sense the ends do or do not 
justify the means. Interested readers can find Harald online
at  http://www.webscription.net/p-196-harald.aspx  and
Salamander on my personal Web site.
RF: Which economists have influenced you the most?
Friedman: Other than my father, probably Alfred Marshall,
perhaps  David  Ricardo.  I  got  one  idea  that  has  been 
important to me from Thomas Schelling, another from Earl
Thompson,  and  also  some  interesting  ideas  from  Robert
Frank.  I  am  in  some  sense  a  follower  of  Gary  Becker  in 
economic  imperialism,  Buchanan  and  Tullock  in  public
choice theory, Posner in economic analysis of law, but I’m
reluctant to call that an influence, since it is more a matter of
doing the same sorts of things that those people did first. RF
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